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The discussion of fraud is limited to management type 
!rauds committed +or or against a company4 Management ·frauds 
Rr·e perpetrated by those who are in an upper-level or 
supervisory position and consist of willful misrepresentation 
.J+ ·find.ncial in+orm2"\tion. The paper proceeds witt) suggested 
~pproaches used by accountants to discover potential 
fraudulent situationSD A motivational study conducted by 
~ichigan GRAs is included in the discussion of fraud 
::riminals. Another study by two criminologists has been 
included as a source of characteristics of possible fraud 
~erpetrators and compares them to normal individuals and 
~roperty offenders. Another motivational study by Michigan 
:PAs is presented in the discussion of fraud criminals. 
:inally~ a list of di·ffersllt types of management fraud is 
examined along with ways to prevent and detect their 
Ethical values of many United States citizens have 
greatly diminished since the beginning of society~ The 
cur-Tent decade has been la.bel ed the 1II"Ie EleneF"l::\ti on" because 
people think of what is best for themselves when making 
decisions. One way to accomplish such selfishrless is through 
the practice of fraud. Individuals as well as businesses 
participate in fraudulent acts to benefit themselves. Many 
reasons and ways are available to implement these deceptions 
and illegal events which will be examined throughout this 
The basic definition of fraud is the act of deceiving or 
misrepresenting the truth in order to induce another party 
1 
into surrendering something of value or a legal right. 
However, an absolute meaning of fraud cannot be determined 
because of the constant changing environment. In essence, 
human nature establishes the possibility of fraud because of 
man's standards of truth and justice. As time passes, norms 
change and certain concepts such as fraud must be altered to 
allow for new conditions. People possess the ability to 
reason, but they also are capable of irrational behavior 
leading to false ideas and actions. 
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An ea~ly example of deception ~elates back to the Heb~ew 
Biblical story of Adam and Eve. Eve accepts the serpent's 
temptation to eat f~om the t~ee although she has been wa~ned 
by God not to. All the elements of f~aud a~e found in this 
story: a perpetrator (the serpent), the victim (Eve), and the 
misrepresented fact (that Eve will become godlike if she eats 
from the tree). As shown by this example, deception has 
existed 'for centuries but has not received much attention 
until now. 
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F'raud is the most common human misbehavior in the world. 
Eve~yone can admit to being a pa~ty to a f~audulent act 
whether as the victim or the perpetrator. Deception can be 
accomplished th~ough lying and cheating of which most people 
have taken pa~t one way o~ anothe~ whethe~ intentionally or 
unintentionally. Lying and cheating are both intentional 
ways of deceiving another, but all untruths are not 
considered a fraud~ Such untruths may occur because of 
mista~(es, misinformation~ miscalculation, or unintentional 
ignorance. 
All fraud cases are based upon the concepts of what is 
fair and just. The judge decides a case according to the 
prudent man rule~ The rule regulres the Judge to imagine 
what aM ordinary and reasonable man would have done In a 
similar Situation as the defendant. Previous cases heard on 
3 
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the same type of fraud are also considered by the judge in 
many common law cases~ 
Althoug~1 all types of fraud are important, the focus of 
this paper will be based upon corporate or management fraud. 
This fraud can be defined as the willful misrepresentation of 
financial facts by management or nonmanagement personnel of 
4 
business organizations. Business frauds are intended to 
benefit the organization itself, as in tax breaks, or its 
employees, as in thefts and embezzlements. Corpor-ate frauds 
can be internally generated by agents, officers or employees, 
or externally generated by suppliers or customers. 
The accounting profession has developed an approach 
called "Red Fla9s" to discover potential management fraud 
situl3.tions. Fraud perpetrators are hard to profile, but the 
Red Flags system presents types of situations that auditors 
shoul d consi df2r. Red Flags are descriptions of human dfld 
organizational behaviors that do not prove fraud but indicate 
its potent.L!l. Thus~ a more extensive audit is required to 
either rule out fraud or document its existence~ 
The Red Flags help monitor personal pressures of 
employees, prevent opportunities for fraud, and indicate 
personality factors of employees. These three categories 
form ~ continuum ranging from low to high~ A perscm falls 
along the continuum according to the particular situation. 
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among themselves. Fraud is committed by all levels of 
6 
employees and all types of people. Typically, fraud 1S 
Influenced by dishonest people who are motivated by greed. 
rhese people should not be placed in a position of trust 
because they are driven by personal desires and selfishness. 
Deciding whether a person has a strong desire for 
personal gain is a difficult task~ All people want a certain 
amount of personal wealth, but most obtain it in an honest 
manner. The few who act dishonestly must be watched closely~ 
In order to determine the integrity of a potential employee, 
personality profile tests have been implemented to measure a 
person's honesty. Not all fraud perpetrators fit into one 
profile, but it provides a guideline far companies to adhere. 
Another method to measure ~ potential employee's honesty 
15 a polygraph or a lie detector test. The stress created 
from lying is reflected by changes in pulse rate or elevated 
blood prmssure whIch can be seen during the test. The 
effectiveness of the test has been relatively high in the 
past~ but people do not loo~( upon them favorably because they 
feel it is an invasion of their privacy~ Nevertheless, a lie 
detector test is a relIable way to evaluate an employee's 
, 
I 
integrity. 
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Edwin Sutherland and Donald Cressey are two 
criminologists who have s}:amined the motivation of criminals 
l3 
and have provided insight on fraud perpetrators. 
2;uther-land's IIdj.+-ferE1nt.iaJ a.ss-:;oc::i.ation" theol'''Y SL\ggest.s that 
criminal behavior- is linked to a person's association with a 
crinlinal environment~ In other wOf-ds~ individuals who 
interact with people having criminal backgrounds tend to 
become crimInals as a consequence of the interaction. 
Sutherland also says that criminal behavior is learned among 
Fraud will be committed if the rewards 
outweigh the possibility of being caught and the punishment 
that will follow. l'his theory explains that a company that 
creates a climate of honesty can reduce crime. 
must follow a defined code of ethics and encourage employees 
to obey the same codsa 
Don.c::il d Cressey·" s II nonshareabl e need II th';?ory dea.I s wi th 
motivation based upon financial gain. The person violates 
his position of financial trust by embezzlement. Three 
elements must exist: a nonshareable problem, an opportunity 
for trust violation, and a set of rationalizations that 
defines the behavior as appropriate. If the person is not 
Michael Comer. bpcppc§t§ EC§Y~. (New York, McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1977). Page 9. 
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COflvinced tllat his actions are acceptable, he will flut 
defraud ttle corporation because he cannot rationalize the 
idea" 
MOMM taxonomy is another classlfication system for 
employee-related crimes. l"he letters stand for Motivation, 
Opportunities, Means, and Methods. The motivational aspect 
consists of economic, ideological, egocentric~ and psychotic 
reasons for people to commit fraud. Employees may steal from 
the corporation because their economic survival is threatened 
due to a financial loss. others defraud a business because 
of spite or anger. Egocentric perpetrators are motivated by 
jealousy or excessive pride. These people want to prove they 
are knowledgeable or clever. The last category of psychotic 
persons are induced to commit fraud because of misperceptions 
or a distorted reality_ 
In order to be induced toward fraud, an opportunity for 
theft must exist within the corporate environment~ Weakness 
in internal, management, accounting, and administrative 
controls provides easy access to material that is subject to 
fraudulent acts. Inadequate reward systems and ethical 
standards also need to be examined and redefined if a company 
desires an honest staff. The external environment can 
threaten a firm and induce fraud. High competition, 
political action, and governmental regulations are examples 
of outside behavior that can motivate businesses to resort to 
theft. 
The means aspect of the MOMM taxonomy consists of the 
various ways to acconlplish the employee-related crimes. 
Employees can overstate assets or revenues, understate 
liabilites or expenses, forge data, destroy records, or 
falsify per-formanes data. Fraud cases are still being 
studied by F.t.ud:i.to~-s to add mOf-e "means" to the list. 
The last part of MDMM is the methods used by 
perpetrators~ Employees tend to compromise controls and 
personnel in order to defraud a corporation~ They tr-y to 
override or bypass internal and accounting controls to gain 
access -to the information they wantw They also r-esor-t to 
bribery and conspiracy_ With other-s involved, people 
begin to believe their actions are not wrong and continue 
until the desired result is reached. 
In addition to the theories of Sutherland and Cressey 
and the MDMM taxonomy, data has been collected fr-om Cer-tified 
Public Accountants on what they feel are the most prominent 
reasons for employees to steal from their employer. 1-) sur-vey 
of one hundr-ed CPAs fr-om Michigan r-eveals that the number- one 
reason people commit fraud is because they feel they can get 
10 
away with it and not be caught. C. J. Silas, CEO of 
Phi 11 i ps F'E~tr-ol eum Company ~ agrees when he says II:::::T!~ of all 
taxpayers cheat because the odds of getting away with it are 
10 
Jack Bologna. ~9CQ9C~tg EC~Y~i Ibg ~~§i~§ gf EC§Y§Qti9Q 
~Q~ Q§t§~t~gQ. (Boston: Butter-wor-th Publisher-s, 1984). 
Page 85 .. 
11 
good. II People enjoy taking risks, but the possibIlity of 
being caught must be minimal before the fraudulent act will 
seem beneficial to the perpetratoru 
The second most important reason employees defraud the 
firm is t.h~.t they think, "Stealing a little from a big 
12 
company won't hurt it~" Much time may pass before the act 
is discovered, but once top management knows of the fraud the 
perpetrator will be punished no matter what size the 
Larger firms are more susceptible to fraud 
because of the number of employees and the pressures placed 
upon them. Personnel controls and evaluations should be 
iOlplemented in these companies in order to deter the 
possibility of theft. 
Many of the Michigan CPAs surveyed agree that most 
employees who steal are caught by accident rather than by 
a.udit~ Therefore, people are not scared of being caught. 
Other reasons relating to the corporation include weak 
internal controls, lenient punishments, and employee 
frustrations with their job or employer. 
Personal reasons also cause employees to defraud a 
busi nf:?SS. These are not as common as other reasons such as 
11 
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finances~ but they should be examined because the 
consequences are just as ser-1DUS. Some employees steal 
I because they feel abused by their boss and seek revenge. 
Others commit fraud because they are dissatisfied with some 
aspect of their personal life such as finances or even love. 
They feel that by stealing from the company they are 
receiving compensation for the frustration they feel. Elome 
employees simply lack morals or ethics which leads them to 
theft. 
c. Nettle,- once stated, "Ther·e is, theil, no olle ,road to 
the violation of a vocational financial trust; there are 
1 :.:; 
many. II Nettier's quote emphasizes the numerous reasons for 
the existence of fraud. Empirical research on fraud 
perpetrators is on-going because substantial evidence is not 
available. The lack of empirical studies influenced the 
authors of ~g~ tg p~t~st ~Qd EC~Y~Qt ~YsiQ~ss EC~Yd to 
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conduct their own research on fraud perpetrators. 
The study focuses on a sample of prisoners convicted of 
fraud and compares them to two other groups. Dne of tile 
groups consists of prisoners incarcerated for property 
o·f·f en ses. The other comparison group comprises college 
G. Nettler. "Embezzlement Without Problems." ~citi§b 
;rQYC~l~!. gf i;:r:jJ]g~lQ!Q9Y. Vol ume 14. Number 1. 1 'n 4" 
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~!J.Q f:::r..~§X§D.t. 
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students. The purpose of the research is to discover whether 
perpetrators, as a group, are different from the normal 
popUlation and other criminals. For the study, perpetrators 
are defined as those who are in a managerial or professional 
position and who illegally apportion thousands of dollars 
15 
their employers . Twenty-three prisoners from the Utah 
. ate Prison serve as the subjects for the research. 
fraud perpetrators are not typical perpetrators 
lecause people who commit fraud usually are not caught and 
rested. Therefore, incarcerated fraud perpetrators are 
ase with the most serious crimes and most extensive 
riminal records. 
Fraud perpetrators are compared with property offenders 
demographics, criminal background, and personailty 
~ariable5 to determine differences between the two groups. 
~he study reveals that fraud perpetrators are considerably 
16 
bider. The older age is understandable because it 
benerally takes a long time to obtain a managerial position 
~r a position of trust. Women tend to become fraud 
terpetrators more than males. Since women have greater 
fpportunitles to obtain jobs that allow them to 
~----------1-~w 
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steal~ they will become evel1 more lnvolved ir, fr-aud. lhe 
older age of fraud perpetrators helps explains wtlY Alore of 
them are married, have children, and live a more stable 
Social differences are also found by this study. 
pet.rat.Drs are more likely t.o have a higher educat.ion t.han 
:her" cr"iminals" They are less likey to use alcohol or drugs 
nly because of t.he older age of perpet.rat.ors and t.heir 
of drug use. Fraud criminals are shown to 
·va a shorter arrest record, except for those who are 
"ncarcerated because of the severity of the crime committed. 
IP,-rm,m"'t.y offenders ar-e ,found t.D begin t.heir crimInal beha,viDr 
at a younger age and are more likely to be sent to juvenile 
17 
correction +acilities. 
Fraud perpetrators and property offenders also possess 
105v'c:hological differences with I'"(;?spect to per-sonality tr-ait.sm 
7 
fj 
Ie involved in fralld seem to have more opt.imism, self-
self-su'fficiency, achievement. motivation, and family 
Propert.y offenders show more depression, self-
radat.ion, dependence, lack of mot.ivat.ion, and family 
18 
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social isolation and hostility are expressed by fraud 
perpetrators. All these differences suggest that Fraud 
perpetrators are similar to normal people with healthy 
personalities and socially acceptable characteristics. A 
study by Glick and Newsom support this by indicatIng that 
embezzlers appear like normal persons who are sincere, 
19 
likeable, and socialable. 
Next, fraud perpetrators are compared to a group of 
college students. This part of the study shows that fraud 
perpetrators are more similar to college students than 
property offenders. Only six out of 15 traits were 
discovered as significant differences, thus supporting the 
Idea that fraud perpetrators are guite normal. White-collar 
criminals are more dishonest, have more psychic pain, and are 
more independent, sexually mature, socially deViant, and 
20 
empathetic when compared to college students. Despite 
these six differences, fraud perpetrators are considered very 
similar to normal college adults but guite different from 
other criminals~ 
Comparing fraud perpetrators to other crimInals helps 
auditors predict what types of people may commit white-collar 
crimeSa Not one single explanation can cover all kinds of 
o , 
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fraud, but at least professionals have a place to begirl their 
research and investigationsu Studies on the motivatIon of 
perpetrators are not the only ones conducted with respect to 
fraudu Auditors have also developed different forms of fraud 
initiating trom both internal and external sources. 
Within the internal and external types of fraud are four 
divisions: larcenous, misrepresentative, manipUlative, and 
extorsive. Larcenous frauds provide no concealment because 
the victim company's records will not disclose the theft, 
the records are insufficient to identify the perpetrator, the 
victim condones the fraud, or the thief does not have access 
21 
to any concealment course of action. Falsification of a 
personal, commercial, or physical reality before, during, or 
after the theft either to assist its commission or conceal a 
105s refers to misrepresentative frauds~ Manipulation refers 
to the falsification of accounting records before, during, O~ 
after a larcenous or a misrepresentative theft. This type of 
fraud is also intended to conceal the illegality or assist in 
its commission. Finally, the extorsive division consists of 
frauds that use force, blackmail, or coercion. 
Internally generated frauds are committed by a 
corporartion's own officers, agents, directors, or employees. 
These people have access to and control of accounting record, 
21 
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iut have limited access to physical assets. Two t yp."s of 
~rauds originate internally: management and operational. 
~oth contain all four divisions discussed earlier which are 
fe,-y simi 1 a .... in each type. For example, the one difference 
let ween inte .... nal la .... cenous management and inte .... nal la .... cenous 
!pe .... ational f .... auds is the type of assets at .... isk. 
I 
fanagement frauds involve conflicts of interest~ misuse and 
Iheft of office supplies and equipment, misuse of compute .... 
lata~ and misuse of secretarial services. 
I 
Stealing tools or 
~tOCkS are categorized as operational thefts. Anothe,-
~perational fraud includes the use of machines, equipment, or 
ime to perform private or conflicting work. 
Misrepresentative management and operations frauds also 
,ave only one significant difference~ Management type thefts 
~re restricted to a physical or commercial event to which the 
Ihie·f is a pa .... ty. An example involves a company that loaned 
~ambling machines to cafes and clubs whose sales manager 
! 
~ampered with the cash meters on the machinesu The fraud is 
I 
~f a physical reality and the thief is a party to the event 
i 
ecause he was responsible for reading the cash meters and 
acording the profits. However, misrepresentative operations 
~5uallY are restricted to a physical reality over whiet, the 
i 
~hief has contr-ol. These f .... auds include falsifying accident 
f- .... ·_·_·_-_·_ .. _ ...... · 
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claims for insurance or compensation, altering time clock 
cards, and misrepresenting inventory levels. 
The most prevalent and costly corporate frauds are the 
23 
manipulative management thefts committed internally. These 
frauds consist of embezzlements, computer crimes, false 
purchases, and false performance reports. Since the thief is 
in a management position, he has much access to accounting 
records which conflicts with the opertaional frauds. The 
latter type of frauds are performed by operations employees 
who only have access to SOurce documents which are limited in 
information~ Examples of manipulative operations theft 
include payroll padding, false cash purchases, and false 
expense claims. 
The second source of frauds are externally generated and 
consists of business contacts, opportunities, and organized 
thefts. External frauds are committed by suppliers~ vendors, 
or customers who have limited access to business premises, 
assets? and accounts. The first type of external theft is 
larcenous bUSiness contacts which are similar to internally 
generated larceny. The only difference is the source of 
risk which is outside the firm. The conversion of stolen 
gOOds into cash is a perfect example of an externally 
generated larceny as the goods are returned to the same 
company from which they were taken. 
-----------
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Larcenous opportunist thefts differ from the other 
la~cenie5 because they consist mainly of petty or high impact 
thefts. The opportunity to steal the assets must be created 
by the thief through trespassing or altering his business 
24 
status. Robbery, burglary, hold-ups and factory thefts a~e 
classified as part of this catego~y. 
The last larcenous fraud is of an organized type that 
is preplanned and di~ected toward hIgh-valued consumer goods. 
The thief often ~elies upon inside information f~om a 
collusive ~elationship with an employee of the victIm 
company. Industrial espionage is an excellent example of an 
externally organized theft. 
The next category of exte~nally gene~ated thefts are 
misrepresentative~ Business contacts are frequently 
established with the main objective as fraud. The thief 
misrepresents an event over which he has cont~ol or to which 
he is a party. Examples include c~edit card f~auds, 
insurance frauds, con games, and investment frauds. The 
external opportunists gene~ally misrep~esent a commercial 
~eality that is directed towa~d a third party. Resulting 
from such an action is a loss of an intangible asset like 
market share by the victim company. Finally, an organized 
misrepresentation can also be employed by a perpetrator. 
24 
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These frauds involve a physical reality and result in a loss 
of a tangible asset by the victim company. Counterfeiting 
and forgery fall into this final type of misrepresentative 
fraud. 
Next are the externally manipulative frauds. Business 
contacts can also be used to manipUlate information found in 
documents that exist because of the business relationship 
between the victim and the perpetrator. False investment 
data and false credit applications are classified as 
manipulative frauds. The opportunist manipUlates accounting 
records that are outside the ownership or control of the 
victim company. The thief has access to the information and 
can create a false record or destroy an existing one. 
Organized manipulation usually involves an employee of the 
victim company who has internal access to records. These 
employees are generally driven by greed and become a party to 
the conspiracy. 
External extorsive thefts are similar to those that are 
internally generated. They are produced through force, 
blackmail, or coercion but the sources are found outside the 
firm. fhe threat may be directed toward the owners of 
the corporation or the employees depending on whether the 
loss is hidden among records or is obvious on the financial 
documents. 
As can be seen, several categories of fraud have been 
formulated by auditors and other professionals. 
Understanding the different characteristics of each type 
~ases fraud detection and prevention~ No matter which theft 
~5 committed, the perpetrator will try to utilize the best 
I 
~oncealment course possible to limit the chance of being 
i 
"aught. From all the classes of frauds, extorsive and 
~anipulative are the most dangerous and difficult to detect. 
prevention techniques have been developed to help deter these 
I 
~wo types of fraud as well as the many others. 
I The prevention methods incorporate the "Red Flags" that i 
~ave previously been described. As a review~ Red Flags 
~onsist of situational pressure, opportunities, and 
~ersonality traits. A corporation does not desire to 
~liminate all pressures because individuals work well 
I 
under- a 
~oderate level of stress. However, an overwhelming amount of 
i 
pressure can lead an employee to commit fraud. 
Avoiding unrealistic performance expectations is one way 
i 
~o reduce situational pressures. Companies with a lido it. at 
25 
attitude encourage employees to behave dishonestly. 
I 
~nvolving people in setting performance goals is an excellent 
~ethod for establishing realistic expectations. Personal 
, 
~ounSeling should be available to employees. People with 
~ICOhOI, drug, and financial problems tend to commit fraud 
~ecause of the intense pressures. A last way to reduce 
I 
~ituational pressures is to implement fair and uniform 
~."--.... "-.. - ...... -- ... "-.. 
~.,,: 
~.d 
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personnel policies. Resentment of superiors can be created 
through policies that reflect unfair treatment of employees; 
thus they seek revenge on the corporation. 
Decreasing the opportunity for fraud requires tight 
j tIt J ~,j .in~t~rna con':ro.s. Corporations must monitor bUSiness 
transactions and interpersonal relationships of Suppliers, 
purchasing agents, bUyers, and sales representatives to 
insure honesty and subjectivity. 
Accurate accounting records 
must be maintained to produce effective reports. Separation 
and rotation of duties should also be implemented. 
Individuals with total control over an operation are capable 
of fraUdulent acts because no one is available to monitor 
their performance. Separating duties allow corporations to 
discover illegalities easier. Group work is also an 
effective way to reduce opportunity to commit fraud because 
people enjoy being able to identify with a team. 
Regardless of the situational pressures and the 
opportunities to commit fraud, the dIshonest act is still 
~~6 
performed by the individual. SOCiety holds individuals 
responsible for their behavior, thus encouraging them to 
adopt a strong ethical code~ 
Managers should teach honesty 
through lectures, group diSCUSSions, written materials, 
casual ~Dmments, and moral behaviors~ Honest and dishonest 
-- - ._- ._- -.- -- _ ..- ---
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behavio~ mL!st be defined by top management. HI'1 e;.~pl ici t codl:::': 
of conduct should also be adopted and followed by all 
personnel. Keeping f~aud and its consequences a sec~et from 
employees can influence perpetrators to continue their 
dishonest actions. If white-collar criminals are never 
prosecuted, employees perceive the act as not very severe. 
Penalties for fraudulent activities should be harsh in order 
for personnel to understand the intensity of the crime. 
Severe punishments will not eliminate fraud, but it does act 
as a deterrE~nt. 
Prevention techniques do not always work for every type 
of fraud, but they provide a startinq point for auditors. 
Comparing previous fraud cases to current ones adds insight 
into what should be done to remedy the situation. 
against crime, a corporation should constantly review 
policies and controls. Employees need to know what is 
expected of them and the consequences that follow if rules 
~::\re d i sobey-ed. Implementinq the above procedures will help 
eliminate some of the thefts and create a more honest working 
environment.. 
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